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THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: TRANSGENIC
ANIMALs AND THE PATENT LAW
The recent development of transgenic animals' poses unique patent
law questions. In 1988, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) approved the first patent for a transgenic animal.2 The subse-
quent debate spawned by this approval pits two vital, yet distinct Ameri-
can industries on opposite sides: biotechnology and farming.' To date,
Congress has remained silent on the issue of animal patents.4 However, a
1980 Supreme Court holding approving a patent for a microorganism
lends support to the PTO's decision,5 and may foreshadow Congress' ul-
timate response. In any event, Congress' reaction to the PTO decision,
even if merely silent approval, will have considerable effect, as evidenced
by the arguments marshalled by representatives of biotechnology and
farming.6
The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact patent laws.7
Under this authority Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1952 (the Act).'
Section 101 of the Act directs the PTO to issue patents to "[w]hoever
1. A transgenic animal is one into which researchers introduce foreign genes while the animal
is still in an embryonic stage. Jaenisch, Transgenic Animals, 240 SCIENCE 1468 (1988).
2. Patent No. 4,736,866. See The Nat'l Law J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 3, col. 1. The patent was
issued for a transgenic mouse, developed for the study of breast cancer. Id. The transgenic mouse is
the only animal patent issued to date, though approximately 30 animal patent applications are cur-
rently pending. See also Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals Hearings before the
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 871 (1987) (statement of the American Farm Bureau Federation, National and Environmental
Resources Division) [hereinafter Hearings].
3. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
4. There have been several recent attempts to legislate in this area. In 1988, three separate
bills were introduced in Congress, however, all three failed. Two of the bills proposed bans on the
patentability of animals. See H.R. 3119, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1988) (two-year moratorium
on animal patents); S. 2111, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1988) (complete ban on animal patents).
The third bill, passed by the House, would have provided a limited exemption from infringement
liability for farmers who reproduce patented animals, and declared humans beings not patentable
subject matter. H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REc. H7436 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988).
The Senate did not vote on the bill before Congress adjourned, and it is uncertain whether the bill
will be reintroduced in the following session.
5. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (application for bacteriums upheld). See
infra text accompanying note 14.
6. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
7. "The Congress shall have the Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof... ."I Through the broader language of section 101 Congress
sought to spur research and development that would benefit the public. 10
Toward this end, Congress declared generally that any unauthorized use
of a patented invention constitutes an act of infringement for which the
user is liable to the patent owner. 1
In 1987 the PTO announced that genetically altered animals are pat-
entable subject matter. 2 Acting under this policy, in 1988 the PTO
granted a patent for a transgenic animal-a genetically altered, cancer-
9. Id. § 101. Section 101 is a recodification of the original patent law enacted by the first
Congress in 1790. See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790). Subsequent enactments
merely employed the identical language of the 1793 statute, which remained unchanged until 1952,
when Congress substituted the word "process" for "art." See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 308-09 (1980).
10. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The productive effort...
fostered [by the patent laws] will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens."). The underlying philosophy of the patent laws, in the
words of Thomas Jefferson, is that "ingenuity should receive liberal encouragement." 5 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERsoN 75-76 (Washington ed. 1981).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (mere use of a patented invention constitutes infringement). See also D.
CHIsUM, PATENTS § 16.031] (1987).
12. Nonnaturally Occurring Non-Human Animals Are Patentable Under § 101, 33 PAT,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 827, at 664 (Apr. 23, 1987) (The PTO "now considers
nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be patenta-
ble subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101."). The PTO's exclusion of human beings from
its expanded definition of patentable subject matter is based on its belief that the thirteenth amend-
ment's proscription of slavery would bar such patenting.
Fears that introduction of human genes into the germ line (the genetic material passed on to
offspring) of animals will blur the distinction between human and nonhuman are, at least for the
foreseeable future, exaggerated. As one scholar stated:
It is important ... to understand that the best that a genetic engineer can do is to add one
gene, or at most, a couple, foreign genes to an organism and have that organism survive
and be important. An organism's tens of thousands of genes are finely tuned with respect
to each other. And it takes a very clever molecular biologist to add even a single gene in a
way so that this fine tuning will not be significantly interrupted. So, one cannot take genes
from a chicken and add them to a cow's chromosome and get a cow that lays eggs. Mon-
ster animals or weeds that get out of control will not result from this technology.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 218 (statement of Winston J. Brill, Ph.D., Agracetus Corp.). See also
Karny, Regulation of the Environmental Applications of Biotechnology, ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1987), re-
printed in Hearings, supra note 2, at 923-24 ("As work [with genetic transfer] went forward, it
became clear that the initial fears about the possible risks were greatly overstated .... [Tjhere was
no evidence of any harm to human or animal health or the environment from [genetic
engineering].").
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sensitive mouse developed for the study of breast cancer.13 While the
PTO decision to grant animal patents is not expressly authorized by the
Patent Act, the decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of section 101 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.'4  In
Chakrabarty a sharply divided Court held that a genetically altered, oil-
eating bacterium was a patentable "composition of matter" within the
meaning of section 101.15 In sweeping terms, the Court declared that
section 101 encompasses "anything under the sun that is made by
man."
16
The PTO's decision to issue an animal patent raises the question of
whether an inventor will enjoy legal protection for his transgenic animal
creations. Acts constituting patent infringement are somewhat more
complicated when the patented invention is a living organism.17  As
noted above, generally any unauthorized use of a patented invention con-
stitutes an actionable act of infringement. 8 Clearly, the unauthorized
sale of a patented animal would constitute such an infringement. 19
Moreover, under the Plant Patent Act of 193020 and the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970,21 both asexual and sexual reproduction of pat-
13. See supra note 2. See also The Nat'l Law J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 3, col. 1; 332 NATURE 668
(1988)
14. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15. Id at 305, 318 (5-4 majority).
16. Id. at 309. See also In re Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (1987). In Allen the PTO
affirmed a patent examiner's rejection of an application to patent a polyploid oyster because § 103 of
the Act requires that the invention not be "obvious." However, the PTO relying on Chakrabarty,
rejected the argument that the oysters were unpatentable because they were living entities. Id. at
1427.
The language of § 101 does not suggest a distinction between microorganisms and higher animal
forms; if the former are "composition of matter" within the meaning of the statute, it follows that
the latter are patentable as well. Further, the Court's broad interpretation of § 101 in Chakrabarty
undoubtedly encompasses the patentability of animals. In order for the Court to treat bacteria and
mice differently, the Court would have to divine from the phrase "composition of matter" a distinc-
tion between higher and lower life forms that is simply not there. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315.
17. There are several unique problems involved in obtaining a patent on living organisms. See,
e.g., Note, Microorganisms and the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not to Deposit, That is the Question,
52 FORDHAM L. REv. 592 (1984) (discussing the problems of how an applicant deposits a patented
microorganism with the PTO).
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19. D. CHISUM, supra note 11, § 16.031]; E. LIPscoMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 22:1
(1987) ("[A] single sale (of a patented invention] is sufficient to constitute a trespass on the patentee's
patent property and an infringement of his patent").
20, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2364 (1982).
21, 35 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1982).
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ented plants without authorization constitutes an infringement. 22 Simi-
larly, under the Act, a patent owner may exclude others from making the
patented invention and from reconstructing a depleted patented prod-
uct.23 By analogy, it seems apparent that an unauthorized reproduction
of a patented animal through breeding would constitute infringement.2 4
Yet, even should liability attach to the unauthorized breeding of pat-
ented animals, courts may apply a judge-made exemption from liability
which they have used in the past. This exemption applies when the un-
authorized use of a patented invention is purely one of research or experi-
mentation and lacks any commercial purpose.2 5 However, most recent
decisions considering this "experimental purpose" exception construe it
narrowly.26 In fact, the experimental purpose exception has rarely been
the basis of a successful defense against an alleged patent infringement.27
Whether the courts will revive the experimental purpose doctrine to ex-
empt from liability the laboratory use of patented animals is uncertain.28
As a precursor to possible legislative debate on the issue of animal
patents, it is worth considering the reactions of two key American indus-
tries to the PTO's approval of animal patents. The biotechnology indus-
try has made a strong case against a per se ban on animal patents. The
industry argues that banning animal patents would force researchers to
resort to trade secrecy to protect their inventions. This reaction, contend
the researchers, would inevitably obstruct the free flow of information
necessary to maintain the United States' competitive edge in medical re-
22. 35 U.S.C. § 2483(a) (1982).
23. D. CHISUM, supra note 11, § 16.03[3] (1987).
24. The PTO has taken the position that "unauthorized acts of reproduction... [of patented
animals] would seem to be an infringement." Letter from Patent Office Commissioner, Donald J.
Quigg to Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 576-80.
25. D. CHISUM, supra note 11, § 16.031].
26. Pfizer, Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 157, 161 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("[Ihe underly-
ing rule of permissible experimental use demands that there must be no intended commercial use of
the patented article, none whatsoever, if the exception is to be recognized at all."); Douglas v. United
States, 181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 176 (Ct. CL 1974) ("the defense of experimental use has been only spar-
ingly applied); Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 357
(1957) (maintaining that the "experimental use" doctrine should be completely abolished). But cf
Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 617
(1985) (discussing necessity of the "experimental use" doctrine).
27. D. CHIsuM, supra note 11, § 16.031].
28. Resolution of this question may depend upon Congress. See supra note 4 for discussion of
recent Congressional attempts to legislate in this area.
[Vol. 67:653
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search.29 Patent protection for transgenic animals is beneficial under this
view because it promotes industrywide disclosure of important research
developments while simultaneously protecting researchers' proprietary
interests in their work.30
In stark contrast to the biotechnology industry, the farming industry is
opposed to the approval of animal patents because of the potentially ru-
inous economic effects such patents might have on livestock farming.3 '
29. Adler, Biotechnology as an Intellectual Property, 224 ScIENCE 357, 361-62, reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 2, at 650, 655-56.
30. Id. The importance of encouraging such research is evident merely from the nature of the
inventions themselves. Genetic engineering has delivered bacteria that can produce human insulin
and promises cows that produce human insulin and secrete it in their milk. Brill, Genetic Engineer-
ing Applied to Agriculture" Opportunities and Concerns, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1081, 1083 (1986),
reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 226-32.
Furthermore, transgenic animal research has made AIDS research possible. Eisenberg, Proprie-
tary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987).
In the future, genetic engineering will likely create larger and more rapidly developing animals.
Brill, supra note 30, at 1082. It further promises greater insight into the genetics of cancer and
mammalian development. Jaenisch, supra note 1, at 1468.
31. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 306-12 (statement of Farmer Union Milk Marketing Cooper-
ative and Wisconsin Farmers Union). Farmer opposition to animal patenting, however, is by no
means unanimous. Id. at 116-35 (statement of the American Farm Bureau Federation).
Also in opposition to arguments made by the biotechnology industry, animal rights organizations
and some religious leaders argue vehemently against the issuance of animal patents. Animal rights
activists fear that patent holders will mistreat animals and that animal patenting will somehow
cloud the ownership of wild animals. Iad at 63.64 (statement of John A. Hoyt, President of the
Humane Society of the United States). Mr. Hoyt expressed concern that animal patenting will cre-
ate new health problems and will diminish genetic diversity within a species. Id The Humane
Society also fears that animal patents will cause economic concentration of the livestock industry.
See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussion of a farmer's exemption from infringement
liability).
Religious leaders argue that the patenting of animals poses serious nonsecular issues: "The gift of
life from God, [in] all its forms and species, should not be regarded solely as if it were a chemical
product subject to genetic alteration and patentable for economic benefit." Hearings, supra note 2, at
401 (statement of religious leaders against animal patenting).
The foregoing arguments against permitting animals to be patented, however, do not survive
closer scrutiny. The animal rights activists offered no evidence in recent hearings to support their
allegations that patent owners will mistreat genetically altered animals merely because they are pat-
entable. See generally Hearings, supra note 2. Furthermore, it simply does not follow that patented
animals will be mistreated with any greater frequency than other animals. Similarly, fears that
animal patenting will "cloud the ownership of wild animals" miss the mark because animal patents
are granted for genetically altered animals, not for wildlife. In re Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425
(1987) (patent for a genetically unaltered "polyploid oyster" denied for reasons of obviousness). See
supra note 16 for a discussion of Allen. As a result, it seems apparent that wild animals cannot be
patented because they fail to meet the statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 and 112 (1982). The objections of religious leaders, though lofty in their
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Under the PTO's 1987 policy,32 if a farmer breeds and raises patented
livestock, the law would require him to pay a royalty fee for each off-
spring produced.33 Quite expectedly, many small farmers fear they will
be unable to afford such royalties and, therefore, will be unable to market
genetically altered livestock. As a result, they will face the prospect of
competing in the markets against genetically superior animals 34-- ani-
mals that produce larger and higher quality yields.3 5
The scientific community recognized this problem and is exhorting
Congress to provide a patent infringement exemption for farmers as a
means of quelling farm opposition to animal patents.36 Under such an
exemption, farmers would be able to breed and produce patented live-
stock without paying a royalty fee. Granting this exemption would also
allow the PTO to gain much needed experience with animal patents.
The importance of transgenic animals to scientific and medical re-
search is indisputable. Quite simply, patents provide the proper incentive
to encourage open scientific discussion of genetic engineering. It is im-
praise of the gift of life, amount to nothing more than an emotional conclusion that animals should
not be patented.
Animal rights activists argued to the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice: "Animal patenting violates the basic ethical precepts of civilized society
and unleashes the potential for uncontrollable and unjustified animal suffering .... If patenting of
animals is permitted, there will surely be a dramatic increase in the suffering of animals resulting
from agricultural, biomedical, and other industrial research." Hearings, supra note 2, at 62-63
(statement of John A. Hoyt, President of the Humane Society of the United States). Such concerns,
however, while relevant to regulating genetic engineering, are of little help in determining whether
the products of legal genetic engineering should be patentable.
32. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
34. Hearings, supra note 2, at 306-12 (statement of Farmers Union Milk Marketing Coopern.
tive and Wisconsin Farmers Union).
35. Other farmers oppose animal patenting aside from the issue of patent infringement because
they fear the almost certain increased yields resulting from the use of patented animals will only add
to the already glutted farm markets. Id. "The patenting of animals would almost guarantee addi-
tional milk production at a time when we are already in surplus .... Animal patenting is hardly an
answer to this Wisconsin dairy farmer's prayers." Id. at 312. See also id. at 115 (statement of Cy
Carpenter, National Farmers Union).
36. McCormick, Animal Patents, 6 BIOTECHNOLOGY 623 (1988) ("If the biotech community is
to convert farmers from powerful opponents into powerful allies, it must accept the realities of the
farm market and tailor its notions of proprietorship to fit.").
37. A bill passed by the House would have provided: "[ilt shall not be an act of infringement
for a person whose occupation is farming to reproduce a patented transgenic farm animal through
breeding...." H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H7436 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988).
Subsequently, this bill died in Senate committee; Congress adjourned before the Senate voted on its
provisions.
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portant to recognize that a per se ban on animal patents will seriously
handicap the U.S. biotechnology industry. However, it is also notewor-
thy that unbridled issuance of animal patents may adversely affect the
U.S. farm industry. Absent deliberate congressional review of the issue
of transgenic animal patents, it seems prudent to continue issuing animal
patents to genetic engineers, while simultaneously calling on Congress to
grant on an interim basis a limited exemption from liability for breeding
patented farm animals.
Robert L. King
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